This paper examines whether trade liberalization should lead to a greater incentive for countries to invest in transportation infrastructure investment. Special attention is paid to the case of preferential trade liberalization between neighboring countries, where transportation investments such as roads or railroads are specific to the partner country and will thus have spillover effects. The existence of spillovers will lead to the existence of gains to cooperative agreements on investment levels.
I. Introduction
One of the salient features of the preferential trading arrangements (PTAs) that have proliferated in recent years is that the member countries tend to be located in the same geographic region. The European Union, NAFTA, and Mercosur, which are among the most prominent examples of PTAs that have initiated or expanded market integration in recent years, all consist of countries that are located in the same geographic region. It has become common to refer to countries that are close in geographic proximity as being "natural trading partners," because the lower costs of transporting goods to nearby countries would reduce the amount of cost difference required to generate trade between the countries. The concept of natural trading partners was first used by Wonnacott and Lutz (1979) , and has been popularized recently by Krugman (1991) . A somewhat stronger statement is frequently made, which is that there is a presumption that preferential agreements between natural trading partners are welfare improving. Frankel, Stein and Wei (1995) provide a systematic simulation analysis of this issue in a model that allows for intra-continental transport costs that are lower than inter-continental transport costs. They find evidence that "unnatural" trading blocs between countries on different continents typically reduce welfare, whereas "natural" trading blocs between countries in the same continent will raise welfare if intercontinental transport costs are not too low. If intercontinental transport costs are very low, then continental blocs may also be welfare reducing. It should be noted that the usefulness of the concept of natural trading partners to characterize trading blocs that are welfare-improving is not without controversy. Bhagwati and Panagariya (1996) argue that these results are highly sensitive to functional forms, and provide examples in which it is more desirable to form a link with more distant country.
A common feature of the models of natural trading partners is that the level of transportation costs is taken to be exogenously given, with transport costs being lower between nearby countries.
2 However, it may in fact be quite costly to transport goods between two nearby countries if the transportation infrastructure between the countries is not well developed, a problem which is frequently encountered in developing countries. This has been particularly noticeable in the case of the Mercosur countries, where cross-border transportation links have been quite poor. For example, three-quarters of the overland trade between Brazil and its western neighbors travels over a single bridge over the Uruguay river. 3 Also, railway transport between Brazil and Argentina is hampered by the fact that the respective countries' railroads were built with different gauges of rail. The formation of Mercosur has created pressure to expand the infrastructure 2 Frankel, Stein, and Wei (1995) ) use a gravity model to explain trade patterns and find evidence that the volume of trade between countries is negatively related to the distance between them, which is consistent with a role for transport costs. Furthermore, they include dummy variables for regional groupings as a proxy for the effect of preferences, and find some significant coefficients. In contrast, Amjadi and Winters (1997) construct a direct measure of transport cost from trade data for Mercosur countries. They find that transport costs average approximately 6% of intra-Mercosur trade for Brazil and Argentina and 12% of trade with the rest of the world (excluding Chile). They point out that the differential of approximately 6% between within bloc and outside bloc trade is well below the differential found by Frankel, Stein and Wei to represent natural trading blocs in their simulations.
investments between the member countries, as evidenced by the fact that Chile's free trade agreement with Mercosur commits Chile and Argentina to each spend $150 million on improving transportation infrastructure (The Economist (1996) ). Similarly, the entry of Greece, Portugal and Spain into the European Union has resulted in substantial investment in transportation infrastructure investment in these countries. In addition, an Infrastructure Committee was created as part of the single market initiative to coordinate transportation investments across countries.
These examples suggest that the degree to which countries are "natural" trading partners is to an important sense endogenous. The purpose of this paper is to examine the incentives for investment in transport infrastructure between geographically proximate countries, and to examine how these incentives are affected by trade liberalization. A main feature of this analysis is to focus on the fact that transport investments between nearby countries are frequently country-specific, such as roads or railroads, which lower transport costs between those countries but have little impact on transport costs with the rest of the world.
These types of infrastructure investments differ from investments in seaports and airports, which typically reduce transport costs to many different locations. Coordination of investments is likely to be particularly important in the former type of investment, where the productivity of investment by one country is likely to be significantly affected by investments in the other country (e.g. adopting the same gauge of railroad track). 4 Therefore, we will examine how the level of investment is affected by coordination between the countries, and whether coordination in infrastructure investments is enhanced by preferential trade liberalization between the countries. This question is important for policy purposes, because it will help to answer whether cooperative agreements on infrastructure levels are complementary with trade agreements and should be tied to preferential trading arrangements or whether investment coordination can be undertaken independently of 4 A good example is provided by transportation costs for Uganda, a landlocked country. A World Bank (1997) evaluation of transportation cited 8 causes of inefficiency in the road transport of imports, 5 of which related to inefficiencies in Kenya. These included a slow weight bridge system and convoy system in Kenya, lack of properly operating cranes at the port of Mombasa, and slow evaluation of transit cargo. trade liberalization.
Section II of the paper analyzes the optimal degree of infrastructure investment for a small open economy, and examines how the incentives to invest in infrastructure are related to trade policy in the absence of coordination issues. One's intuition might suggest that since trade liberalization is associated with an increase in the volume of trade, the return to trade-related infrastructure investments should rise with the volume of trade. This intuition is incorrect in the case where trade is restricted by tariffs and the government chooses transport levels to maximize national welfare. In the case where demands are linear, the optimal level of transport cost investment is independent of the level of the tariff because governments have an offsetting incentive to invest in infrastructure when tariffs are high in order to expand the volume of trade and alleviate the effects of the tariff distortion. However, if trade is restricted by quotas, infrastructure investments will be higher when trade is liberalized.
Similar issues arose for rail transport through Kenya.
Section III extends the analysis to consider the case of a customs union between two countries that are small relative to the rest of the world. It is shown that the question of whether the non-cooperative equilibrium results in underinvestment relative to the cooperative outcome depends on the pattern of trade between the countries. It is shown that in a customs union in which trade continues with the rest of the world, the benefits of transport cost reduction will not be symmetrically distributed between the countries. The country experiencing an improvement in its terms of trade will have an incentive to overinvest relative to the cooperative level, while the other country will have an incentive to under invest. The overall level of investment in the non-cooperative equilibrium may be higher or lower than in the cooperative equilibrium, depending on the degree of substitutability between the investments by the two countries. In contrast, in the case where the formation of the union eliminates trade with the rest of the world, the non-cooperative equilibrium will involve lower levels of investment by both countries than the cooperative equilibrium. This follows because the effects of each country's infrastructure investments spills over to affect the other country through changes in the terms of trade. In each of these cases, the overall benefit to the union of transport cost reduction is independent of the level of the tariff when demands are linear.
Section IV examines the linkage between trade and infrastructure investments between nearby countries. It is shown that there is a basic independence between trade and infrastructure agreements when demands are linear, because the efficient level of one variable (tariff levels or investments) is independent of the level of the other variable. It is also shown that when negotiations over tariff rates take place after infrastructure investments have been made, countries will use investments strategically to influence tariff negotiations. Infrastructure agreements can be used to internalize these effects, which leads to efficient choices of infrastructure. This represents a second form of benefit from cooperative infrastructure investments. Section V offers some concluding remarks on the relationship between infrastructure investments and other forms of public goods in customs unions that have been studied.
I. Infrastructure Investments in a Small Country
In this section we examine how the benefits of reductions in transport costs are related to the level of tariffs and the volume of trade for a small country. We analyze a simple partial equilibrium model in which there are two traded goods, with the numbering of goods chosen such that good 1(2) is the home country import (export). 5 We begin by deriving the effect of reductions in transport costs on national welfare. These results are then used to derive the optimal level of infrastructure investment, and to examine how the optimal
5
The partial equilibrium model is chosen to simplify two aspects of the problem: the existence of income effects in demand and the effect of infrastructure investments on the outputs of the two goods. This partial equilibrium model can be interpreted as a general equilibrium model in which there is a traded good 0 with zero tariffs and transport costs. The production side is assumed to have goods 1 and 2 produced using sector-specific capital and mobile labor, while good 0 and transport infrastructure investments require only labor. With this production structure, changes in infrastructure investment will change only output of good 0, and not that of 1 or 2. Preferences for the goods are assumed to be represented by a utility function U 1 (D 1 ) + U 2 (D 2 ) + D 0 , where D i denotes consumption of good i and U i is a strictly concave function, so that all income effects are absorbed by good 0. The absence of income effects allows good 0 to be used to make transfers investment level is affected by trade liberalization. between countries for the case of a customs union considered later.
A tariff reduction must be welfare-increasing for a small open economy when t 1 > 0. When domestic price is above world price, the increase in trade volume created by a tariff reduction is welfare increasing. A reduction in transport costs has two favorable effects on welfare: (i) it improves the terms of trade for the small importing country by reducing the costs of imports and raising the return per unit of exports (at given prices in the rest of the world) and (ii) it has a favorable effect on the volume of imports. The favorable terms of trade effect is proportional to the volume of trade, indicating that reductions in transport costs are more beneficial when the volume of trade with the rest of the world is large.
A. Optimal Transportation Infrastructure in the Small Country Case
Now suppose that domestic resources can be devoted to investments in infrastructure that reduce transport costs. These investments could include projects to upgrade roads and railroads, port facilities, and airports. Our analysis will focus on the case in which these investments are public goods, so it is natural to think of the government as making the decisions on the level of investment to undertake. We will treat this as a two period model, with r denoting the amount of investment in transport cost reduction made in the first period. The level of unit transport costs in the second period is v = f(r), where f' < 0, f" > 0 reflects increasing marginal infrastructure costs of reducing unit transport costs. The present value of second period welfare for the country, given an investment of r in the first period, is ßW(t 1 , f(r)), where ß is the discount factor on second period payoffs. Note that the second period here should be interpreted as being the life of the investment. which requires equating the marginal social benefit of transport reduction to the marginal cost.
7
If the tariff level is being set to maximize national welfare, then the tariff will be zero independently of the level of transport costs. However, suppose that the government is constrained in its ability to change tariff levels, so that the level of the tariff is viewed as exogenously given by the government. We could then consider a second best exercise of examining the optimal level of r given the tariff, in order establish how the incentive to invest in infrastructure varies with the level of the tariff. Totally differentiating (3) > 0 as long as the home import demand schedule is not too concave in p 1 . Since benefits depend on the volume of trade and the volume of trade rises as transport costs fall, this creates a tendency toward increasing marginal benefits of transport cost reduction. Therefore, satisfaction of this condition requires that f be sufficiently convex. An interior solution with r > 0 and v > 0 can be guaranteed by assuming lim r→0 f'(r) = -∞ and that lim r→∞ f(r) > 0. cost reduction. The first is that an increase in the tariff reduces the volume of trade, which reduces the costsavings resulting from an increase in r. The second is that a higher tariff raises the distortion on imports, which raises the amount of tariff revenue gained by a reduction in transport costs. In the case of a linear demand curve, these two effects exactly offset (i.e. the numerator in (4) is 0) and the tariff has no effect on the optimal r. If the home import demand curve for imports is convex (concave) in p, then an increase in t 1 will increase (decrease) the optimal r. A convex import demand schedule has a smaller trade volume effect when the tariff is high, which raises the benefits of transport cost reduction.
The analysis in this section has been made under the assumption of a specific tariff to simplify the presentation. This result will also hold in the case of an ad valorem tariff as long as the tariff is imposed on the fob price of the import. Letting t 1 ( t 2 * ) denote the ad valorem import tariff imposed in the home (foreign) country, home country prices will be > 0. When the tariff is imposed on the transportation cost component of the price, an increase in the tariff raises rate makes the benefits of transport cost reduction larger because the trade volume effect is larger. It then follows that the optimal infrastructure investment will be increasing in the tariff rate with linear demand. . This yields two results on the differences between optimal transport cost investments under quotas and those under tariffs. First, the level of transport investment will be greater under a tariff than under the equivalent quota, because the tariff creates an additional benefit of transport cost reduction due to the impact on trade volume.
9 Second, an expansion of the quota must result 9 Note that with endogenous transportation costs, the equivalent tariff for a quota of is the optimal level of investment for the tariff t 1 .
in an increase in the optimal level of r, regardless of the shape of the import demand schedule. Thus, trade liberalization should result in an incentive to increase the amount of investment in transportation infrastructure.
Note that the level of infrastructure investment chosen with the quota is the same level that would be chosen if protection was provided by tariffs and the infrastructure investment were being made by the private sector with projects being evaluated at domestic (rather than world) prices. It is also the level of investment which minimizes the present value of transport-related costs for a given trade volume, ßf(r)(M 1 +X 2 ) + r, which includes both infrastructure costs and unit costs.
The results of this section for the small country case can be summarized in the following result: These results will serve as a useful benchmark, because they yield the linkage between trade policy and infrastructure in the absence of spillovers between countries.
III. Infrastructure Investment in a Customs Union
In this section we analyze the case in which there are two small countries, A and B, trading with the rest of the world. Countries A and B are assumed to be located next to each other, so that infrastructure investments in one country have an effect on the productivity of investments in the other. In this section we will analyze the effect of cooperative infrastructure agreements between the two countries by comparing the investment levels that arise when the countries behave non-cooperatively. In particular, we will examine how this comparison depends on the pattern of trade between the two countries and on the existence of a preferential trading arrangement between the two countries.
We analyze a two good model, as in the small country case, with the pattern of comparative advantage will be chosen such that country A (B) imports 1 (2) and exports good 2 (1) at the initial world prices and tariff rates. The rest of the world, denoted by *, assumed to be sufficiently large that world prices ) country A imports good 1 from both B and * and exports good 2 to both B and *. Figure 1a illustrates the initial trade pattern, with the costs of moving goods (transport costs plus import tariffs) between the markets indicated next to the respective arrows. Transport costs between either country and the rest of the world will be an exogenously given at v * . These transport cost links can be thought of as seaports or airports, which are not specific to transport costs with a particular country and are thus less subject to coordination problems in investment level.
Reductions in transport costs or preferential trade liberalization between A and B will lead to an increase in the volume of trade between A and B. Two cases will be considered in the analysis below. In case I, shown in Figure 1a , country A continues to trade goods 1 and 2 with the rest of the world after the formation of the union. The linkage between prices in the two countries is then given by the following relationship:
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In case I prices in country A and the domestic price of B's importable are determined by the exogenously given prices in the foreign country, while country B's export price is determined by trade/transport barriers between A and B. In case II, the supply of good 2 and demand for good 1 in country B are sufficiently large that a preferential tariff reduction results in the elimination of trade between the union and the outside world.
Prices in A and B are thus given by
In case II, domestic prices in both countries are endogenously determined as in the case of two large countries.
In this section we will emphasize two types of spillovers that occur between the member countries of the customs union as a result of infrastructure investments. The first spillover is the impact of investments by one country on the level of transport costs and the profitability of investments for the other country as where the domestic prices are determined by (6). Domestic prices in A will be unaffected by changes in either tariffs or transport costs, but for country B we have dp 1 B = -dv -dt 1 AB and dp 2 B = dv + dt 2 BA . (12) requires that the marginal benefit of transport cost reduction to the union as a whole equal the marginal cost of transport cost reduction in each location.
(11) and (12) can be used to compare the level of cost reduction in the non-cooperative equilibrium investment in the non-cooperative equilibrium with that in the cooperative equilibrium, which is shown in Figure 2 . The MB B curve in Figure 2 is the marginal benefit to B of transport cost reductions (the left hand side of (11)) which will be upward sloping for the case of linear demand. . If the investments are perfect complements, on the other hand, then r A = r B = 0 in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Since A does not invest, the marginal cost of reducing v is arbitrarily high in B and no investment will take place. In this case, the cooperative equilibrium must lead to higher investment than in the cooperative equilibrium.
Conditions (11) and (12) . Summing these two terms, it can be seen that there is no effect of trade liberalization on optimal investments for the union as a whole when demand and supply curves are linear.
These results can be summarized as:
Proposition 2: (a) In the non-cooperative equilibrium for infrastructure investments in case I, the country (A) whose internal prices remain constant will make no infrastructure investments. The country whose terms of trade improve (B) earns a higher marginal benefit from infrastructure benefit than for the union as a whole when it has preferential access to the partner's market. The level of unit transport costs in the cooperative equilibrium may be higher or lower than in the non-cooperative equilibrium. (b) Trade liberalization has no effect on the incentives to invest for the union as a whole when demand/supply curves are linear, but will increase the transport cost investment of B in the noncooperative equilibrium.
This suggests that when the trade pattern takes this form, there is no reason to tie cooperative agreements on transport costs to trade liberalization agreements.
B. Case II: Customs Union with No Trade with Non-members
We next consider Case II, where the preferential tariff reduction eliminates trade with the foreign country. Note that this is an example of the cases discussed by Wonnacott and Wonnacott (1981) in which a customs union can achieve gains that cannot be obtained from unilateral liberalization, due to the endogeneity of the terms of trade for each country. When two large countries are negotiating tariff reductions, individual countries will not have an incentive to unilaterally reduce their tariffs from the Nash equilibrium level because the benefits of tariff reduction spill over to affect the other country. This creates a prisoner's dilemma, which requires simultaneous trade liberalization by the two countries. In this section we show that a similar prisoner's dilemma will arise with regard to infrastructure investments, because countries fail to internalize the full effects of transport cost reductions on the other country. In this case, the investment levels in the noncooperative equilibrium will be too low.
Using (7) in (13), we obtain the effect of reductions in transport costs to be welfare to be Install Equation Editor and doubleclick here to view equation.
A reduction in transport costs must raise A's welfare, just as it did in the small country case. However, A
does not obtain the full benefit of transportation cost investments it undertakes because part of the benefits spill over to B through changes in the terms of trade. A similar spillover is associated with investments by B.
The gain to A (B) is smaller (larger) the greater is the impact on B prices, We can now use (15) and (16) The efficient investment level is the one that maximizes the sum of the welfare levels of the two countries. Using (16), the necessary condition for optimal investment in the cooperative case is
The cooperative investment levels will internalize the effects of each country's investment on the other's welfare level.
These results can be used to obtain the relationship between trade liberalization and the returns to infrastructure in each country. We will establish the following result for the large country case: = 0 is that the benefit of tariff reduction is independent of the level of transportation cost. Thus, trade agreements with nearby countries are not more attractive than agreements with distant countries when demand is linear in this model. Note that this necessary condition would arise if trade restrictions are in the form of country-specific quotas, as in (5) for the small open economy case, or if effects on tariff revenues are being ignored. Since the volume of trade increases when trade is liberalized, trade liberalization will result in an increase in the returns to infrastructure investment and typically to a reduction in unit transport cost in the cooperative equilibrium.
IV. Tying Together Infrastructure Agreements and Preferential Trading Arrangements
The analysis so far has concentrated on optimal choice of infrastructure, under either a cooperative or non-cooperative choice of investments by the two countries, treating the tariff as exogenously chosen. We conclude by discussing the implications of these results for an environment in which countries have the option of negotiating both tariff rate reductions and infrastructure investments as part of their preferential trade arrangement. We will analyze two cases: one in which countries simultaneously choose infrastructure levels and tariff rates, and one in which infrastructure investments are made in the first period and tariff rates are chosen in the second period. The second case is intended to capture the notion that once transport cost investments have been sunk, they may influence subsequent trade negotiations between the countries.
We begin with the case in which the countries can write a contract in the first period that commits them to infrastructure investments and second period tariff rates. given by (12) [ (17)] evaluated at the optimal tariffs.
Note that in either case, the efficient trade agreement between the two countries is independent of the level of transport costs between the two countries. Thus, the level of tariffs that is chosen by the simultaneous negotiation over tariffs and infrastructure is the same as the one that would be obtained when only tariffs are being negotiated. Similarly, Propositions 2b and 4b established that in the case where demand curves are linear, the infrastructure investment levels obtained in a cooperative agreement will be independent of the level of tariff rates negotiated between the two countries. Combining these results yields an independence between efficient trade agreements and infrastructure agreements in the linear case, since the value chosen in either efficient agreement for the union would be independent of the levels chosen in the other agreement. In particular, there would be no incentive for a country to sign a trade agreement that is inefficient (e.g. an agreement that gives B preferential access to A's market in case I) with a cooperative infrastructure agreement, because there are no spillovers of the trade agreement to the infrastructure agreement.
It should be noted however that the fact that the efficient trade agreements are independent of the level of infrastructure investments is not sufficient to guarantee that independent negotiations for infrastructure and tariffs will reach the same solution as joint negotiations. If negotiations are constructed sequentially, then it is possible that countries will use their first round negotiations to influence their bargaining position in the future round. For example, consider the case in which countries choose infrastructure investments in period 1, and then negotiate tariff rates in period 2. This problem would arise if countries cannot commit to future tariff rates, so that any tariffs in period 1 would be renegotiated in period 2. 13 Assume that lump sum transfers between the countries are possible and that the negotiation process can be modeled using the generalized Nash bargaining solution. The negotiated tariff rates and the lump sum (15)), but the small country will not capture all of the gains from transport cost reductions in the tariff war because the large country's tariff is decreasing in v. It can be shown that increases in the r A will raise T AB when A is a small country, so that A will underinvest in infrastructure relative to the results obtained in (3).   14   14 Using (14), it can be shown that the optimal tariff for country i is t i = M i (p j )/X j' , which yields t A = 0 and t B > 0 when A is small. Differentiating with respect to v in the linear case and using (13) < 0). This yields the conclusion that in the case where infrastructure levels are chosen non-cooperatively, the tariff negotiation process will create an incentive for the two countries to alter their investment levels in order to influence the period 2 tariff negotiations.
Note however that if the negotiation process creates an incentive to increase its investment, it will also create an incentive for the other country to reduce its incentive.
The strategic use of infrastructure investments to influence tariff negotiations by the two countries , which is the same as in the simulatneous negotiations. The existence of negotiations in period 1 allows firms to internalize the effects of investments on the future negotiation process and to obtain efficient investment levels.
V. Conclusions
This paper has shown that the linkage between infrastructure investments and trade liberalization depends critically on the degree of terms of trade spillovers between countries. The prediction generated by this model is that in the absence of cooperative agreements between countries, there will be under investment in those forms of transportation in which the investments have spillover effects to other countries. This would suggest, for example, that for a relatively small country there should be under investment in railroad and highway infrastructure to neighboring countries relative to airport and harbor infrastructure. The former types of investments are specific to certain markets, and are likely to have an impact on the relative prices of the goods in those markets. The latter type of investment, on the other hand, will send goods to world markets generally, whose prices are likely to be relatively unaffected by the investments. Two forms of gains from infrastructure agreements have also been identified. The first is the role of these agreements in internalizing the terms of trade effects and thus avoiding the inefficient investment levels that arise in noncooperative choice of investment levels. The second is to internalize the effects of the infrastructure investment on the tariff negotiation process in cases where countries cannot commit to future tariff rates.
The infrastructure investments analyzed in this paper can be compared with other work which has analyzed the role of coordination of public goods investments within a customs union. The key feature of the transportation infrastructure investments analyzed in this paper is that the benefits of these investments is related to the volume of trade between the two countries. The results of this paper might then be applied to other types of public goods investments whose benefits are tied to trade with a particular country. For example, harmonization of standards or market rules that reduce the cost of selling goods in a particular trading partner's market would yield similar results.
The infrastructure investments analyzed in this paper contrast with public goods analyzed by Clarida and Findlay (1994) and Chiu (1997) , who consider the case in which public goods investment raise the productivity of all resources within a country. Clarida and Findlay (1994) obtain an underinvestment result when public goods investments in one country raise productivity of resources in the other country, and analyze how capital mobility within the customs union may create a public investment boom. The underinvestment result does not necessarily arise in the case of transport infrastructure investments because the spillovers between countries depend on the pattern of trade. Chiu (1997) considers the possibility that public goods investments also affect non-member countries, and examines the incentives to form trading blocs which coordinate investment levels when non-member countries can free ride on union public goods investments. The analysis in the current paper has abstracted from spillover effects of infrastructure investments on the rest of the world. The approach taken in this paper would suggest that the spillovers to outside countries would differ depending on whether investments are general transport investments that reduce costs with all trading partners or investments that are tied to costs of trading with a particular partner.
